Summary:
Since early 2026, French counterintelligence services have dismantled nine clandestine structures operating in France under the direction of China’s Ministry of Public Security. These undeclared extensions of Chinese police stations were embedded primarily within Chinese community and cultural associations, especially in the Paris region. They monitored the Chinese diaspora of approximately 600,000 people, targeted dissidents for forced repatriation, issued passports and other administrative documents, and collected intelligence to recruit informants described as “talents.” Following a year-long investigation, French authorities closed the structures and initiated expulsion proceedings against three Chinese nationals identified as their heads. Two expulsions have been carried out; the third remains pending before the Council of State. The Chinese Embassy in France has characterised the sites as overseas service centres intended to assist expatriates with home-country authorities, denying any police functions or political activities. These actions follow earlier French measures in 2024 against embassy-linked intelligence officers and align with international scrutiny of similar overseas operations.
Detailed Report
1. Identification and Nature of the Clandestine Structures
French counterintelligence services, operating under the Directorate General for Internal Security (DGSI) within the Interior Ministry framework, identified and subsequently dismantled nine clandestine structures functioning as undeclared extensions of Chinese police stations on French territory. According to exclusive reporting published by Le Monde on 18 June 2026, these sites operated under the direct authority of China’s Ministry of Public Security (MPS), China’s primary police body. Most were established inside existing Chinese community or cultural associations rather than in standalone facilities. The Interior Ministry described them as non-declared “extensions of Chinese police stations on French territory” acting on MPS orders.
The structures were concentrated in the Paris region, including sites linked to associations in the 13th arrondissement (Chinatown area around Tour Ravenne) and the 12th arrondissement (Rue du Faubourg-Saint-Antoine), as well as locations in Fleury-Mérogis in the Essonne department. One documented example operated from the premises of the Fujian Association of Industrialists and Merchants (FAIM), housed within the offices of a company named Naumy. These locations allowed integration into community networks while maintaining operational cover. Assessments by the DGSI, conveyed in a July 2025 parliamentary response reported by Europe 1, had already formally recorded the existence of nine such clandestine commissariats prior to their closure.
2. Operational Activities and Methods Employed
The nine structures engaged in surveillance of the Chinese diaspora, pursuit of regime opponents for potential forced return to China, provision of consular-like administrative services such as passport issuance, and intelligence gathering aimed at recruiting informants. Le Monde reporting notes the operators of these sites received instructions via WeChat from MPS officials, including directives to facilitate visits by senior MPS personnel and municipal leaders from cities such as Fuzhou. One structure prominently displayed signage referring to a “Fuzhou Police Overseas Service Station.”
These activities formed part of wider patterns of transnational engagement previously documented in reports by Safeguard Defenders and addressed in a June 2023 European Parliament resolution urging member states to investigate such outposts and related United Front Work Department activities. French authorities assessed that the sites collected information on individuals considered hostile to Chinese government positions and sought to exert pressure for repatriation or compliance. The Interior Ministry emphasised that maintaining contact with a foreign power in this manner undermined France’s fundamental interests. No public evidence has indicated involvement in violent acts on French soil; with operations focused on monitoring, administrative facilitation, and influence.
3. Timeline of Investigation and Enforcement Actions
French counterintelligence initiated a dedicated year-long investigation that culminated in the dismantling of the nine structures in early 2026. This followed heightened scrutiny after a March 2024 incident at Paris-Charles de Gaulle Airport in which Chinese Ministry of State Security officers attempted to force a dissident and companions onto a flight to China. French police intervention prevented the departure, leading to the expulsion request for the two officers involved.
By mid-2025, the DGSI had already quantified nine active clandestine structures in response to parliamentary questioning, as reported by Europe 1. Expulsion orders were issued against identified heads, with the Interior Minister at the time, Bruno Retailleau, signing an order against one individual on 11 May 2025. The closures in early 2026 represented the operational culmination of the investigation rather than a single coordinated raid.
4. Notable Individual Cases and Supporting Evidence
Exclusive Le Monde reporting detailed the case of Ni Chaowen, 57, a Chinese national who arrived in France in 2001 and regularised his status in 2012. Ni served as president of the Fujian Association of Industrialists and Merchants from 2023 while, according to Interior Ministry assessments, running one of the clandestine stations from association premises linked to his company Naumy. Questioned on 18 September 2023, Ni initially acknowledged hosting activities related to passport services before retracting elements of his statements. Evidence presented included a WeChat message dated 9 December 2021 containing MPS instructions and a photograph showing Ni with association members in front of signage for a Fuzhou police overseas service station.
A separate 2024 incident involved the targeting of dissident Ling Huazhan, whose passport was reportedly taken by individuals linked to a clandestine structure near Gare Saint-Lazare. These cases provided concrete illustrations of the structures’ methods. The third head facing expulsion proceedings appeared before the Council of State on 9 June 2026, where the public rapporteur recommended upholding the measure. Two of the three heads have already departed France under expulsion orders.
5. Official Responses from French and Chinese Authorities
The French Interior Ministry stated that the structures operated as extensions of MPS authority and constituted undeclared police activity on national territory. Counterintelligence services carried out the closures without public announcement at the time, consistent with operational security practices. Chinese diplomatic representatives approached the French Foreign Ministry to defend the good faith of the individuals and entities involved, receiving only an assurance that France would proceed discreetly, according to a senior French diplomat cited in Le Monde.
The Chinese Embassy in France maintained that the sites functioned solely as “overseas service centres” to facilitate contact between home-city authorities and Chinese expatriates, explicitly denying any political or police character. This position aligns with earlier Chinese government responses to similar allegations in other countries. French authorities did not accept this characterisation, proceeding with closures and expulsions on the basis of DGSI findings.
6. Legal and Diplomatic Repercussions
Three Chinese nationals identified as heads of the structures became subject to expulsion measures under French immigration and national security provisions. Two expulsions have been executed; the third is under judicial review at the Council of State. No criminal charges against the individuals have been publicly detailed in available reporting. The actions reinforce France’s legal framework governing foreign interference, including obligations under the 2017 intelligence law and subsequent measures addressing transnational repression.
7. Context Within Broader Patterns of Overseas Operations
The nine structures formed part of a documented international network of Chinese police overseas service stations. A 2022 report by Safeguard Defenders identified more than 100 such facilities operating in 53 countries across North and South America, Europe, Africa, and Asia. Governments including the United Kingdom ordered the closure of similar sites in 2023; the Netherlands and Ireland took comparable steps. Canada’s Royal Canadian Mounted Police and Australian authorities conducted investigations into reported stations. In the United States, the Department of Justice indicted individuals for operating a secret police station in New York. Germany highlighted these outposts in its China strategy as examples of transnational repression. A May 2023 G7 Hiroshima Leaders’ Communiqué called on Beijing to respect the Vienna Conventions on diplomatic and consular relations. A June 2023 European Parliament resolution urged coordinated action against activities linked to the United Front Work Department.
French awareness of these patterns predates the 2026 dismantlements, with DGSI monitoring referenced in parliamentary exchanges and public reporting. The 2026 operation represents a significant enforcement step within France’s evolving approach to foreign interference, prioritising sovereignty and protection of individuals targeted by extraterritorial pressure. These developments align with international efforts to address transnational repression affecting diaspora communities from regions including Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong, and mainland China.
Conclusion
French counterintelligence services have closed nine clandestine structures linked to China’s Ministry of Public Security after sustained investigation, resulting in the expulsion or pending expulsion of three identified heads. The sites’ documented activities centred on diaspora monitoring, administrative services, and influence operations. These measures reflect France’s determination to address undeclared foreign police activity on its territory while operating within established legal and diplomatic channels.