Summary:
The National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS), the research institute of Japan’s Ministry of Defense, published its China Security Report 2027 on 13 November 2026. The report focuses on China and the South China Sea. Its authors assess that China aims to turn the sea into a de facto Chinese “inland sea”, excluding the US military and taking complete control.
In the report’s account, China advances by salami-slicing, gaining control one step at a time without giving rivals a reason to go to war. Scarborough Shoal shows how it works. Since gaining de facto control of the shoal in a 2012 standoff with the Philippines, China has drawn baselines around it to claim the surrounding waters, kept a coast guard ship there on 352 days of 2025 and declared it a nature reserve. Its artificial islands in the Spratlys, militarised despite a 2016 arbitral ruling against China’s claims, give it bases across the sea.
That advance is carried out by three forces working together. The coast guard, now under military command, has 686 vessels, the largest coast guard fleet in the world. A record 241 maritime militia vessels a day operated in the sea in 2025. The navy has begun to step in directly, and the authors warn that a destroyer’s obstruction of a Philippine coast guard ship in August 2025 risked military confrontation.
The authors find control of the sea central to any war over Taiwan, in which China would aim to blockade the Bashi Channel and keep US forces out. It would also shelter China’s six nuclear-armed submarines based on Hainan Island. Washington has resisted that effort across four administrations, but carried out only two freedom of navigation operations in 2025.
The Southeast Asian claimants have responded in different ways. The Philippines has confronted China with growing US backing, while Vietnam and Malaysia avoid confrontation. Vietnam has been enlarging its own features, and its reclaimed land now equals about 70% of China’s total. Efforts to agree shared rules have stalled. On 15 November the Philippines said the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China had provisionally agreed about 80% of a code of conduct for the sea, but would not conclude it this year.
The authors do not expect China to seize features held by other claimants. They expect it to keep advancing short of war, and describe the current calm as a precarious equilibrium.
Detailed Report
1. NIDS Report Maps China’s Ambitions and Tactics Across the South China Sea
The National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS), the research institute of Japan’s Ministry of Defense, published its China Security Report 2027 on 13 November 2026. This year’s report, China and the South China Sea: The Dynamics of Maritime Issues, was written by three NIDS researchers led by Shoji Tomotaka, director of the Department of Area Studies. His co-authors are Iida Masafumi, director of the Department of Advanced Domain Studies, and Goto Yohei, a research fellow in the China Division. The report states that the views are the authors’ own and do not represent those of the Japanese government, the Ministry of Defense or NIDS.
The authors’ central assessment is that China aims to turn the South China Sea into a de facto Chinese “inland sea” by excluding the military presence of the United States and other states and taking complete control of its waters. They note that China’s May 2025 national security white paper places the South and East China seas alongside Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong and Taiwan in its discussion of territorial integrity.
The sea covers some 3.5 million square kilometres and links the Pacific and Indian oceans. It is a rich fishing ground and is believed to hold large reserves of oil and natural gas. Six parties contest sovereignty over its Spratly and Paracel islands and the maritime rights attached to them: China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei. In the report’s account, the dispute became a security concern between China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in the 1990s, eased in the 2000s and revived around 2010 as China pressed its claims at sea. It has since come to include a military confrontation between China and the United States.
The report states that China has built up its navy, its maritime law-enforcement agencies and a maritime militia, and deployed all three on a large scale. It relies on the law-enforcement agencies and the militia in particular for coercive, aggressive acts that stay below the threshold of military operations, which the report terms grey-zone situations. The strategy behind these acts is known as salami-slicing: expanding and consolidating China’s de facto control one step at a time, without giving rivals a justification to use military force. Reclaimed and militarised features in the Spratly and Paracel islands make that strategy possible.
2. China’s 50-Year Advance: From Naval Battles to Artificial Islands
The report traces China’s effort to expand its control of the sea back to the 1970s, and its first gains came by force. In January 1974 China’s navy attacked South Vietnamese warships and took the whole Paracel chain, about 300 kilometres south of Hainan Island. The clash left more than 100 South Vietnamese and more than 80 Chinese casualties. In March 1988 Chinese and Vietnamese forces clashed at Johnson South Reef in the Spratly Islands, where China sank two Vietnamese vessels and went on to seize six features. More than 60 Vietnamese are said to have died. The authors note that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has not fought a foreign force since.
The next gain came through military pressure rather than battle. In February 1995 China built an observation post on Mischief Reef, then under de facto Philippine control, and answered Manila’s protests by sending naval vessels until the Philippines gave way. Calm then returned for roughly a decade from the late 1990s, as Beijing sought closer economic ties with Southeast Asia.
When tensions returned around 2010, China put its maritime law-enforcement agencies at the front. Their patrol ships detained Vietnamese fishermen and cut the cables of Vietnamese survey vessels. In 2012 a Philippine Navy frigate inspected Chinese fishing boats at Scarborough Shoal, about 200 kilometres off the Philippine island of Luzon. Chinese patrol ships intervened, and a two-month standoff followed. The Philippines withdrew under what Manila understood to be a US-brokered deal for both sides to pull back, but the Chinese ships stayed, leaving the shoal under China’s de facto control.
The loss of Scarborough Shoal drove the Philippines to legal action. In January 2013 Manila began arbitration proceedings under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, challenging the legal basis of China’s nine-dash line. The line, first drawn on a 1948 map by China’s Nationalist government, places much of the sea within China’s claimed historic rights. China gave it official form in 2009, attaching it to a note to the United Nations Secretary-General, but has never explained how it fits with international law. Beijing refused to take part in the arbitration. In July 2016 the tribunal ruled that China’s claims based on the line had no legal basis and that its island-building in the Spratlys was unlawful. China dismissed the award as “a worthless piece of paper”.
In December 2013, with the case under way, China began turning seven reefs and rocks it controlled in the Spratlys into artificial islands. In about a year and a half it reclaimed 13 square kilometres of new land, most of it at Fiery Cross, Subi and Mischief reefs. During a visit to the United States in September 2015, President Xi Jinping said China “does not intend to pursue militarization” of the islands. Each of the three largest now has a runway of about 3,000 metres with aircraft hangars. Radar and anti-aircraft guns have also been installed on the islands. They have become PLA outposts and bases from which Chinese naval, coast guard and militia vessels keep a constant presence at sea.
3. China’s Coast Guard Comes Under Military Command and Asserts Governance at Scarborough Shoal
The report finds that China treats its quarrels with other claimants as internal matters, regarding the sea as an extension of its land territory. Chinese planning documents count about 3 million square kilometres of surrounding waters as China’s maritime territory. A 1992 law names Taiwan, the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands and the South China Sea island groups as Chinese territory. On that view, the China Coast Guard governs the sea, and its actions there are law enforcement.
China formed the coast guard in 2013 by merging several of its maritime law-enforcement agencies. In 2018 it placed the force within the People’s Armed Police, China’s paramilitary police, and with it under the Central Military Commission (CMC), the country’s highest military command authority. The authors see two purposes in the move: bringing armed bodies under the direct control of the Communist Party and Xi Jinping, and clarifying chains of command and rules of engagement as standoffs at sea grew more frequent. All three of the coast guard’s directors since then have come from the navy. The Coast Guard Law of 2021 gave the force a legal basis for its operations.
The law gives the coast guard powers that go well beyond policing. It may detain and tow away foreign vessels it says have entered Chinese waters illegally, and board and inspect ships in what the law calls jurisdictional seas, a term it never defines. It may use weapons under loosely worded conditions, declare temporary security zones closed to shipping, and carry out defence tasks on the CMC’s orders. The law also gives it authority over fishing, mineral exploration, submarine cables and nature reserves. The report concludes that the law makes the coast guard “an organization combining military and administrative functions”.
The coast guard is now armed to a standard comparable with a military force. It has 686 vessels, according to The Military Balance 2026, making it the largest coast guard in the world. In 2022 the navy reportedly transferred 22 missile corvettes to it, and its cutters carry guns similar to those on navy patrol ships.
Its conduct at sea has turned violent. In February 2023 a coast guard vessel twice aimed a military-grade laser at a Philippine Coast Guard ship near Second Thomas Shoal, a Philippine-held reef where a grounded warship serves as a base. In June 2024 coast guard personnel brandished knives and axes during a standoff at the shoal, and a Filipino serviceman lost his thumb. The authors argue that actions which injure people may amount to a use of force in international relations, depending on their purpose, even when a law-enforcement agency carries them out. In their view, China gives the coast guard administrative powers so that such activity can be presented as governance.
That effort is most visible at Scarborough Shoal. In November 2024 China drew baselines around the shoal, the lines from which a state measures its territorial waters. In 2025 at least one coast guard vessel was present there on 352 days of the year, by one estimate. In September 2025 China declared the shoal a nature reserve. Rules issued in August 2026 divide its management between the coast guard, two national agencies and the government of Hainan province. The coast guard says its patrols target illegal fishing with electric currents and poison, a claim the report reads as a pretext for building a record of Chinese governance.
In April 2026, according to Philippine statements, the coast guard installed a barrier across the entrance to the shoal with the navy and the maritime militia, then removed it several days later. China had put up barriers there before, but each time the Philippines had taken them down. The report treats China’s removal of its own barrier as a measure of how firm its control has become: it can now close and open the shoal at its own discretion.
4. Record 241 Militia Vessels a Day Operate Alongside China’s Coast Guard and Navy
The coast guard works alongside China’s maritime militia, civilians in maritime trades whom the state organises into an armed force under Communist Party control. Chinese law counts the militia as part of the country’s armed forces, with the PLA and the People’s Armed Police, though its members keep their regular jobs and the state funds its activities. Its presence has grown steadily. According to the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, a US research project the report cites, an average of 241 militia vessels operated in the South China Sea each day in 2025, the highest since tracking began in 2022. The coast guard directs the militia in protecting China’s maritime claims, while the navy uses it for logistics and operational support, and both forces train it.
In the report’s account, the three forces increasingly act together against other claimants. One study it cites puts the share of coast guard collisions in the sea that involved the militia at 48%. In February 2024, 15 coast guard ships and 200 militia vessels swarmed waters near Mischief Reef. In August 2025, 16 coast guard ships and nine militia vessels, backed by a navy helicopter and a drone, tried to close in on the Sierra Madre, the grounded warship at Second Thomas Shoal. In such encounters the coast guard and militia ram and encircle the other side’s vessels, while the navy keeps to the air or the background, most likely to avoid escalation.
The militia’s value lies partly in its ambiguity. From the outside, a militia vessel is hard to tell apart from an ordinary fishing boat. The authors note that if militia vessels count as auxiliaries of the navy or coast guard, international law allows them to be attacked without warning, but the difficulty of identifying them lets China exploit that uncertainty.
The navy has now begun to step out from the background. In August 2025 the destroyer Guilin obstructed the Philippine Coast Guard ship Suluan near Scarborough Shoal, overtaking it at high speed and dangerously close range. As it crossed behind the Suluan, the Guilin collided with a Chinese coast guard cutter that was pursuing the same ship, leaving the cutter unseaworthy. The authors conclude that interfering with foreign government vessels has become a navy mission. They call the use of a warship this way a dangerous and irresponsible act that risks escalating into military confrontation, and warn that if it recurs it will seriously threaten stability in the sea.
5. Control of the Sea Would Aid a Taiwan Blockade and Shield Nuclear Submarines
The sea matters to China for more than its territorial claims: the report finds it central to any military move against Taiwan and to China’s contest with the United States. That role has grown as China’s navy, now the world’s largest by number of warships, has pushed its strategy outward. From the 1980s the navy’s task was to defend the near seas inside the First Island Chain, the line of islands running from Japan’s southwestern islands through Taiwan to the Philippines. Since the mid-2000s it has added the protection of Chinese interests in the far seas beyond the chain. Chinese military strategists have given the far seas greater weight since 2020, as competition with the United States has sharpened. The report judges the South China Sea to be of exceptional importance to both missions.
China has never ruled Taiwan but regards it as Chinese territory, and a 2022 government white paper states that Beijing will not renounce the use of force to achieve what it calls reunification. Beijing’s pressure on Taiwan extends into the South China Sea, where Taiwan administers the Pratas Islands near the Bashi Channel, the strait between Taiwan and the Philippine island of Luzon. Chinese coast guard ships began appearing around the islands in 2022. By 2025 they were entering the waters around the islands far more often, approaching closer and timing their activity to coincide with PLA exercises.
Since August 2022 the PLA has repeatedly staged exercises encircling Taiwan, each with a zone in the South China Sea southwest of the island. According to the report, the zone set in August 2022 was probably meant to prepare the PLA to cut Taiwan’s sea lanes through the South China Sea, fight Taiwanese forces resisting a blockade, and strike the Zuoying naval base and the city of Kaohsiung in southern Taiwan.
The exercise zones have consistently sat close to the Bashi Channel, which the authors expect China would try to blockade in a war over Taiwan to keep US forces out of the South China Sea. In their assessment, controlling the sea in such a conflict would keep forward-deployed US forces away from cities and bases on China’s southern coast. With the channel blockaded and air and sea superiority south of Taiwan, the PLA would be better placed to invade southern Taiwan from the South China Sea and to hold off US forces approaching from Oceania or the Indian Ocean.
Control of the sea would also protect China’s nuclear deterrent. China bases six strategic nuclear submarines on Hainan Island, which faces the South China Sea. They are believed to carry the JL-3 missile, with a reported range of more than 10,000 kilometres. The authors note that if the PLA could deny US forces the sea, the submarines could operate there safely and strike the continental United States. In July 2026 a submarine submerged in the South China Sea fired a ballistic missile into the South Pacific, a flight of about 7,300 kilometres, which the report says shows China’s capability is steadily improving.
6. Washington’s Measures to Check China Hold Across Four Administrations, but Patrols Thin
The United States was drawn into the dispute in March 2009, when Chinese vessels obstructed the US Navy surveillance ship Impeccable south of Hainan Island. Until then Washington had stayed neutral on sovereignty and saw little at stake beyond freedom of navigation. The report identifies two concerns behind its change of course: keeping the sea open for the US Navy, and China’s growing ability to keep US forces out of the region and restrict their movement once inside. By 2010 senior US officials were declaring a national interest in freedom of navigation in the South China Sea.
China has kept challenging US forces at sea and in the air. In December 2022 a Chinese J-11 fighter intercepted a US RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft over the sea, coming within six metres of it. China has test-fired anti-ship ballistic missiles into the South China Sea, weapons known as carrier killers because they can strike large ships far from shore. In July 2019 it launched six DF-21D missiles from the mainland towards waters north of the Spratlys, its first such launch into the sea. In August 2020 it fired the DF-26B from Qinghai province and the DF-21D from Zhejiang province towards waters north of the Paracels. The report judges the tests were most likely meant to deter US naval operations there. Chinese forces also shadow US patrols and at times stage large exercises of their own while US exercises are under way.
Washington’s answer has been a package of four measures, which the report finds has largely held across administrations. The first is freedom of navigation operations, in which US warships and aircraft deliberately pass through waters covered by maritime claims Washington considers excessive. The earliest aimed at the artificial islands came in October 2015, when the destroyer USS Lassen sailed within 12 nautical miles of Subi Reef without notice. The others are exercises with allies, help for Southeast Asian claimants to build their maritime capabilities, and criticism of China grounded in the 2016 ruling. The operations’ tempo has varied. They took place every three to five months under Barack Obama, every one to two months in Donald Trump’s first term and every three to four months under Joe Biden, whose administration treated the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait as a single theatre.
The second Trump administration has kept the package in place. Its December 2025 National Security Strategy notes that a third of global shipping passes through the South China Sea each year, and warns that a hostile power controlling it could impose tolls or close it at will. In May 2025 Secretary of War Pete Hegseth raised concerns about China’s coercion of other claimants, and US exercises with allies in the sea have continued. Yet US forces carried out only two freedom of navigation operations in 2025. In February 2026 US military patrols over the sea reportedly fell by about 30%, possibly because forces were concentrated in the Middle East for the military operations in Iran. The authors warn that if the regional balance of power shifts, China may seize the chance to expand its influence further.
7. Philippines Confronts China, Backed by a Deepening US Alliance
The Philippines, a US treaty ally, has taken the most confrontational line of the Southeast Asian claimants. President Ferdinand Marcos Jr began his term seeking closer economic ties with Beijing and visited China in January 2023, but the laser incident near Second Thomas Shoal a month later hardened his stance. Clashes have since become frequent, involving water cannons, lasers and swarms of suspected militia vessels. Chinese harassment aims mainly to disrupt Philippine resupply missions to Second Thomas Shoal, but it has spread to Sabina Shoal, Scarborough Shoal and the Philippine-held Thitu Island. Off Thitu in March 2026, a Chinese navy frigate narrowly avoided colliding with a Philippine Navy landing ship.
US backing for Manila has deepened under both Joe Biden and Donald Trump. In 2023 the allies agreed to give US forces access to four more Philippine bases, three of them in northern Luzon, close to Taiwan. A US Typhon mid-range missile system brought to northern Luzon for an exercise in April 2024 remained there after the exercise ended. During a visit to Manila in March 2025, Hegseth affirmed that the two countries’ defence treaty covers attacks on Philippine armed forces, aircraft and public vessels, including coast guard ships, anywhere in the South China Sea. In February 2026 the allies agreed to deploy more missile and unmanned systems to the Philippines. Other US allies have joined in, which the report attributes to a shared determination to uphold the rule of law and freedom of navigation. Japan has signed agreements with Manila that open each country to the other’s forces for exercises and allow them to supply one another.
8. Vietnam Puts Stability With Beijing First While Its Reclamation Nears China’s
Vietnam, by contrast, has made stable relations with China its priority since its most serious recent clash with Beijing, in 2014. That year China moved an oil rig into waters Vietnam claims, and Chinese vessels rammed and fired water cannons at Vietnamese ships that tried to stop it. Hanoi’s defence policy now rests on the “Four No’s”: no military alliances, no siding with one country against another, no foreign bases, and no use or threat of force in disputes. To Lam, the Communist Party general secretary who also became president in April 2026, needs Chinese cooperation to meet his goals of at least 10% growth in 2026 and developed-country status by 2045. There have been no notable clashes in recent years. Hanoi’s security ties with Washington have grown alongside: in 2025 it received a third decommissioned US Coast Guard cutter and hosted Hegseth in November.
Vietnam has been enlarging the features it holds. It began reclamation in 2021, and further rounds in 2025 and 2026 have extended the work to every feature under its control, with munitions depots and airstrips built on them. By March 2025 Vietnam’s reclaimed land was estimated at about 70% of China’s total, and the report says it could soon surpass it. China’s foreign ministry has voiced opposition, but Beijing has neither campaigned against the work nor interfered with it. The authors suggest China sees Vietnam’s building as deflecting criticism of its own and as remaining within acceptable bounds.
9. Malaysia Stays Moderate Towards China as Its Military Draws Closer to Washington
Malaysia has kept a consistently moderate posture across governments since the 1980s, putting economic cooperation with China first and keeping public debate on the dispute in check. Its distance from China long spared it the friction the Philippines and Vietnam faced. During Xi’s visit in April 2025, Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim praised China as a defender of free trade in a speech that implicitly criticised US tariffs.
China’s growing reach now extends to Malaysia’s waters, where Chinese fishing, coast guard and naval vessels interfere with Malaysian resource exploration. Malaysia’s armed forces have proved more wary than its government. When 16 PLA transport aircraft flew towards the coast of Sarawak on Borneo in May 2021, the air force scrambled jets and issued its own statement while the government stayed silent. The military has deepened its ties with the United States, and in October 2025 Malaysia signed a defence cooperation memorandum with Washington during a visit by Hegseth.
10. ASEAN and China Miss 2026 Target for a Code of Conduct as Core Disputes Persist
ASEAN has sought a code of conduct, a set of rules governing how the parties behave at sea, since the dispute became a full-blown conflict in the 1990s. China was reluctant from the start, fearing a code would constrain its claims and actions. The Southeast Asian states were divided among themselves. Vietnam wanted the code to cover the Paracels as well as the Spratlys, and the Philippines wanted a legally binding treaty, while Malaysia and Indonesia preferred a political document. China’s own draft would have excluded the Paracels and banned military patrols and joint exercises around the Spratlys, with US involvement in mind. In 2002 ASEAN and China settled on a compromise: the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, a non-binding document that named no islands and left a code to future negotiation.
The talks gained momentum only after the 2016 ruling, when China engaged more actively to show that it and ASEAN could settle the dispute peacefully. The two sides endorsed a framework for the code in 2017 and a single draft negotiating text in 2018. Momentum was lost during the COVID-19 pandemic, and the second reading of the text took four years. Indonesia pushed the talks forward as ASEAN chair in 2023, and the third reading was completed in about a year and a half. The core disagreements remained, however: how much of the sea the code should cover, and whether it should be binding. Malaysia’s 2025 chairmanship ended with a summit statement that recorded no concrete progress.
The Philippines made concluding the code a priority for its 2026 chairmanship, though the authors judged that even agreement within ASEAN would be difficult, let alone China’s consent. At the ASEAN summit in Manila on 15 November 2026, two days after the report’s release, Foreign Affairs Secretary Maria Theresa Lazaro announced that the code would not be concluded this year. She said the parties had provisionally agreed about 80% of the draft, up from about 50% when the Philippines took the chair. They had also settled one of four major outstanding issues: the 2002 declaration would serve as the code’s foundation. The code itself would add more effective rules of conduct and provisions for practical cooperation at sea. Whether the code will be legally binding remains unresolved, and diplomats told the Associated Press that the areas it would cover are still in dispute. Singapore will take over the talks when it assumes the ASEAN chair in 2027.
11. China Expected to Keep Advancing Short of War, Leaving a Fragile Calm
The authors expect China to keep extending its control of the sea without fighting for it. Since taking Scarborough Shoal in 2012, China has shown no sign of trying to seize features held by other claimants. Any such attempt would vastly raise the risk of full-scale war, however weak the other side, and in the authors’ judgement Beijing sees no need to take that risk while its current approach keeps gaining ground.
The Paracels show that approach most clearly. China controls the entire chain and is still reclaiming and militarising features there, beginning full-scale work at Antelope Reef in late 2025. In the Spratlys, China may start building on features no other state controls. The Philippines voiced serious concern in 2022 over reports that China had begun reclamation at four previously unoccupied features there. China is likely to keep strengthening its navy, coast guard and militia and to deploy them more widely.
That leaves a calm the authors consider precarious. Clashes between China and the Philippines have not escalated into full-scale conflict, and China and Vietnam have avoided major clashes in recent years. Skirmishes with the Philippines, however, carry a constant risk of escalation through miscalculation. With Vietnam, the open questions are how far China will tolerate Vietnam’s own reclamation and militarisation, and how China’s widening influence will affect the features Vietnam holds. As both keep building, the report expects contradictions between their claims to grow.
Conclusion
The report’s authors conclude that China is steadily turning the South China Sea into an inland sea, gaining ground with its coast guard, militia and navy without open war. Its aim is to push US military influence out as far as it can. With no code of conduct agreed and clashes at sea continuing, they regard the calm that holds as precarious.
The full report is available from NIDS at nids.mod.go.jp.